National security does not develop in isolation. It draws legitimacy and strength from justice (the rule of law), inclusion (political and economic) and social consensus.
No amount of pontification cloaked in nationalistic, religious jargon or the continuous creation of institutions (one after the other) can safeguard national security interests in an environment filled with suspicion, dejection and a lack of trust in these institutions.
German political philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche alluded to this in the following manner: Real authority rests only on the confidence of the people at the bottom.
Nietzsche essentially implies that the ruler’s authority rests on people’s trust and confidence. He believes that if a ruler embodies qualities such as compelling vision, charisma and rhetorical skill, combined with a capacity for self-mastery, creativity and imposition of one’s will on oneself, it may garner a form of respect, if not necessarily trust, in the conventional sense.
Nietzsche simultaneously underscores the critical role of the state in providing security and the conditions for culture to flourish. If a ruler effectively provides these fundamental needs, they may enjoy a degree of instrumental trust. People trust them to maintain order and stability. However, this is not necessarily a deep moral trust.
Nationhood and the authority of the state, by implication, rest on trust, vision, a sense of justice and a feeling of inclusion and security among citizens at large. Incisive words from those at the top and denigration of perceived rivals hardly instil confidence in people.
One wonders if our state institutions offer enough to evoke a sense of belonging and trust. For nearly a quarter of a century, we have been engaged in a war against terrorist forces, accompanied by varying claims of successes.
Now, consider Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi. In his consecutive meetings with US officials and dignitaries from other nations, the minister consistently emphasises the need for the global community to collaborate in combating terrorist threats.
Do not such exhortations amount to essentially imploring counterterrorism cooperation after a quarter century of anti-terror and counter-insurgency operations? The general public undoubtedly points to the extensive list of interventions in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhw and Balochistan, which commenced in 2002. They question why we have not developed our capacity to counter terrorist threats after these protracted years.
A brief retrospective is helpful:
1. Operation Al-Mizan (20022006): Following small-scale military activity since the war on terror commenced in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Al-Mizan as the initial large-scale military response to escalating militant activity in the border regions.
2. Operations Rah-e-Haq I, II, III (20072009): These were a series of operations conducted in the Swat Valley and surrounding areas in response to the growing influence of the TTP under Maulana Fazlullah.
3. Operation Sher Dil (2008): This operation targeted militant hideouts linked to Al-Qaeda, reportedly sheltered by the Haqqani Network, in the Bajaur Agency of the former FATA.
4. Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009): A significant offensive launched in South Waziristan against the TTP and its allied groups.
5. Operation Zarb-e-Azb (20142016): Launched in response to repeated demands by the United States and NATO forces for action against Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. The operation followed the deadly attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi and a series of terrorist strikes on the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman, including the 2009 attack that killed seven individuals.
6. Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017 onwards): Launched in February 2017, ostensibly to establish a legacy for the then Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Bajwa. This operation focused on consolidating gains from previous efforts, disarming and eliminating terrorist sleeper cells and enhancing border security. It involved intelligence-based operations, de-weaponisation campaigns and efforts to counter violent extremism.
7. Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024): Initiated in June 2024, this operation is the successor to Radd-ul-Fasaad and aims to build upon past achievements as part of continued counter-insurgency efforts.
In addition to these major operations and numerous intelligence-based operations, approximately a dozen agencies and institutions, including the Intelligence Bureau (IB), four Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), Air Intelligence (AI), Naval Intelligence (NI), Intelligence Wings of Civil Armed Forces, Pakistan Coast Guard Intelligence Wing, Gilgit Baltistan Scouts Field Intelligence, Frontier Constabulary Intelligence and the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), were actively involved.
In the field of law enforcement, besides the Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa North, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa South, Balochistan North, Balochistan South), several civilian organisations also consistently contribute to anti-crime and anti-terrorist operations. These include the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh and Punjab) and their intelligence wings, four Provincial Police Departments, the Special Branch (Provincial Police), the Airports Security Force (ASF) and the Pakistan Railways Police.
That at least two dozen agencies exist — each with a stated mandate to eliminate non-state actors, criminals and terrorists — raises a fundamental question: why are then special operations still necessary? Shouldn’t these core responsibilities be embedded in the routine functioning of these agencies?
One after the other, “hubs and centres” have emerged, operational costs have gone up manifold, but data on the ground offers a dismal commentary on the overall performance. How many more years and institutions do we need to extricate ourselves from crime and terror?
#Quarter #century #seeking #cooperation
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